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AGAINST CERTAINTY 
Shawn J. Bayern* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In legal argumentation, appeals to certainty and predictability have 
enormous rhetorical power. This Article argues that their use outstrips 
their legitimate role in legal analysis. The Article is not literally ―against 
certainty‖ in the sense that it promotes uncertainty as a good thing in 
itself;
1
 it is just a skeptical consideration of the role of appeals to 
certainty in legal theory. The Article‘s principal contention is that 
arguments about certainty are often mistaken, that certainty itself is often 
misunderstood, and that many defenses of certainty in legal rules are 
tautological, irrelevant, or substantively overstated.
2
 
There are many reasons that certainty has at least a superficial 
appeal in legal reasoning. For one thing, it may comport with analytical 
philosophers‘ desires for conceptual clarity; a pragmatic or pluralist 
mode of analysis may appear unprincipled, intellectually incoherent, or 
simply unhelpful to those who promote formal argumentation.
3
 For 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I thank Mel Eisenberg and 
Mark Seidenfeld for helpful discussions that at least tangentially related to this Article. I also thank 
a workshop at the University of Florida and a local workshop at Florida State for helpful feedback. 
Nonetheless, all errors reflect my own uncertainty. 
 1. For example, it does not promote (or for that matter oppose) uncertainty or 
unpredictability in the law as an affirmative means to achieve a particular communicative or 
instrumental goal, such as a chilling effect on an undesired activity. Cf. Leigh Osofsky, The Case 
Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX. L. REV. 489, sec. III (2011) (critiquing a line of 
scholarship that suggests intentional uncertainty promotes efficient compliance with tax laws); Mike 
Schaps, Comment, Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten 
Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2006) (―[T]he existing 
standard‘s vagueness [in applying the Establishment Clause] creates a chilling effect on government 
endorsement of religion.‖). 
 2. The Article‘s focus is the common law. Its principles may extend to questions of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation, but I leave those questions beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 3. Though writing from a perspective grounded in economics rather than analytical 
philosophy, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott summarize the force of this claim: ―Since courts or 
legislatures are likely to be involved when the relevant social propositions or values arguably favor 
more than one type of litigant or interest group, pluralist theories . . . tend to be least helpful when 
they are most needed.‖ Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
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another, it appears to comport with a variety of political theories that 
emphasize the limited role of courts,
4
 the superiority of rules over human 
judgment,
5
 and formally equal treatment of equals under the law.
6
 It also 
tends to appeal to legal economists, though perhaps interestingly for 
multiple distinct and unrelated reasons.
7
 
This Article surveys and critiques a variety of arguments that 
promote certainty. Part II briefly examines and critiques the general 
landscape of the jurisprudential debate in this area. Part III addresses 
situations—surprisingly common—where courts and commentators 
make appeals to certainty but neglect or ignore substantive nuance that 
makes the arguments irrelevant, in context, to the moral or political 
considerations underlying those appeals. The discussion in Part III 
proves nothing in general; it just demonstrates that arguments aiming to 
promote certainty are often hollow, and it serves as a call for those 
arguments to be evaluated with regard to their context—that is, to the 
certainty or other desirable characteristics they provide in the real world. 
                                                          
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-44 n.2 (2003). For a detailed discussion of monism and 
pluralism in legal theory (as applied to contract law), see STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 214-18 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1534 
(2002) (―The theory of judicial minimalism, another account of judicial review that appears to have 
resonated widely with the academy and courts, uses the political theory of deliberative democracy to 
suggest a greatly curtailed role for courts in the protection of liberty, particularly on socially divisive 
moral issues.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 5. See Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 530 (1999) [hereinafter All er Nuthin’] (―I maintain that the problem law is 
meant to solve is that of information, not immoral motivation—that men are not gods, rather than 
that men are not angels. To solve this problem, law must consist of determinate rules. Standards are 
unhelpful.‖). 
 6. See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1431 (2004) (―So long as one is 
committed to the principle of equal liberty under law, then mercy [with its attendant uncertain 
application] is unattractive within a properly liberal criminal justice system.‖). 
 7. Compare Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 847, 848 (2000) (―[A] rigorous application of the common-law plain meaning and parol 
evidence rules [would] preserve the value of predictable interpretation . . . .‖), and Richard A. 
Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature 
Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 521 (2010), with Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 587-88 
(defending formal rules in contract law on the grounds that they would decrease litigation costs). 
Professor Epstein noted: 
[I]t is important to be aware that the so-called ―formal‖ rules of property law have strong 
functional justifications, deriving from the simple maxim, ―coercion no, cooperation 
yes,‖ which cautions against the use of forced transactions in both areas. Only a system 
of definite rights that are neither increased nor decreased through voluntary transfers can 
achieve that end. The strongest elements of the legal system are those which adhere to 
that simple maxim in all areas. Unfortunately, modern academic thought all too often 
seeks to deconstruct the rules for tangible property, rendering the field more opaque and 
less coherent than it should be. 
Epstein, supra, at 521. 
2012] AGAINST CERTAINTY 55 
Part IV considers the circularity of arguments that define ―rule of law‖ 
values to be consistent only with certain, rather than uncertain, legal 
rules or that otherwise tie the nature or purpose of law to certainty; these 
arguments include both the analytical-philosophical and the political-
theoretic. Part V briefly examines economic and other instrumental 
arguments in favor of certainty. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE BACKDROP TO DEBATES ABOUT CERTAINTY 
A. Defining “Certainty” 
For the purposes of this Article, a legal rule
8
 is ―certain‖ to the 
extent that it proceeds to a definite legal conclusion without reliance on 
contextual judgment. By contextual judgment, I refer to three kinds of 
flexibility in the law—that is, three related features that a legal system 
will exhibit if it is not absolutely ―certain‖ in this Article‘s sense. First, 
contextual judgment may be at least partly case- and fact-dependent; 
there is, for example, typically no way to enumerate in advance every 
possible way in which someone can behave ―unreasonably‖ under tort 
law‘s negligence standard, and, as a result, the negligence principle 
exhibits uncertainty under my definition. Second, contextual judgment 
requires judgment, rather than mechanical application of a logical 
template to a set of facts; for example, even if all the facts in a 
negligence case are known, a determination of a defendant‘s negligence 
depends on some further analysis or interpretation of the defendant‘s 
actions in view of prevailing social notions of reasonableness, and often 
this analysis or interpretation depends on community standards. 
Similarly, social notions may compete or conflict—for example, social 
morality may oppose efficiency in a particular case—and prudential 
judgment may be needed to resolve the conflict.
9
 Third, contextual 
judgment extends to the choice of a rule to govern a legal case; a legal 
system is more certain, under my definition, if its rules can never be 
modified. 
This Article‘s argument, in short, is that legal systems should 
exhibit the three kinds of uncertainty that correspond to these three types 
of contextual judgments. It is desirable, in other words, for legal systems 
to recognize (1) that unexpected facts may properly change legal results, 
(2) that facts require interpretation and social judgment, and (3) that such 
                                                          
 8. For reasons I will describe shortly, I use the term ―rule‖ generally to include what others 
refer to as ―standards‖ in addition to what others refer to as ―rules.‖ 
 9. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14-19 (1988) [hereinafter 
NATURE OF COMMON LAW]. 
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social judgments may require that a formerly prevailing rule of law  
be changed. 
To be clear, these three desirable properties promote ―uncertainty‖ 
only as a matter of definition. Common law courts that can address new 
facts and that can change doctrine may well provide greater real-world 
predictability than those that cannot.
10
 For example, it may never occur 
to contracting parties that a private or trade-specific meaning they apply 
to a written word in their contract might mean something else to the rest 
of society; formal rules of contract interpretation that rely on the public 
―plain meaning‖ of a written contractual term may, in turn, provide less 
real-world predictability and comport less well with the parties‘ 
expectations, even though the rule permits interpretive decisions to be 
made with less regard for factual context.
11
 Doctrinal stability, similarly, 
may either enhance or frustrate real-world predictability—depending, for 
example, on the content of an old rule and on whether parties have relied 
on it in their planning.
12
 
To illustrate the first type of uncertainty—that is, sensitivity to facts 
and context—consider Oliver Wendell Holmes‘s enterprise in tort cases 
like Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman.
13
 In Goodman, Justice 
Holmes decided that when the driver of an automobile crossing a 
railroad track ―relies upon not hearing the train or any signal and takes 
no further precaution he does so at his own risk‖ and thus is 
(contributorily) negligent for the crash.
14
 Holmes had defended this 
enterprise in his earlier classic book, The Common Law,
15
 noting that 
                                                          
 10. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be 
Better for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 182 (2010); see also Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 22-23 (1995) (describing other circumstances 
in which ―strict textualism actually becomes an instrument of uncertainty‖). Professor Raban noted: 
Whether we consider external evidence or whether we blindly follow the literal text, 
there is always the risk of frustrating the parties‘ predictions and expectations. But in the 
former case, we at least consciously deliberate about our decision: we purposely seek to 
align the legal outcome with the parties‘ predictions. 
Raban, supra, at 182. Indeed, two leading economic commentators in contract formalism have made 
a related observation the centerpiece of their argument: they recognize that reliance on text alone 
increases uncertainty, and their argument for interpretive formalism is that the administrative cost 
(primarily in the form of litigation expenses) to decrease this uncertainty is not justified. See 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 572-74. 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. 275 U.S. 66 (1927). Robert Rabin has described the tension between Holmes‘s and 
Cardozo‘s Supreme Court tort opinions, both in his excellent casebook, MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 60-64 (9th ed. 2011), and recently in 
Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 431, 432-35 (2011). 
 14. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. 
 15. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Am. Bar Ass‘n 2009) (1881). 
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judges ought to notice patterns in jury decisions and eventually remove 
decisional authority from juries once they learned how reasonable juries 
would decide particular issues.
16
 His approach stands in contrast to 
Benjamin Cardozo‘s in the later, factually similar, case of Pokora v. 
Wabash Railway Co.,
17
 in which the Court declined to decide general 
factual questions about a driver‘s care near a railroad track and instead 
referred the matter to a jury.
18
 
Holmes‘s approach is more certain under my definition than 
Cardozo‘s, both because it is context-insensitive and because it 
eliminates judgment. It is context-insensitive, because it identifies 
particular facts that matter and at least purports to be insensitive to other 
facts: a driver who does no more than assume that an approaching train 
ought to make an audible signal is, on that basis alone, negligent.
19
 It 
eliminates judgment, because there is no further role for a judge or jury 
once it is found that a driver assumed there was no train because he 
could not hear one.
20
 Moreover, Cardozo‘s effective overruling of 
Holmes
21
 exemplifies doctrinal change—the other feature of an 
―uncertain‖ system of common law. 
B. Rules and Standards, Maximalism, and Minimalism 
These three features of certainty touch on a variety of related 
jurisprudential debates, such as those concerning the proper political role 
of the judiciary (often manifested in modern literature as a debate 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 83-84. Of course, in Goodman, Holmes went further and took decisional authority 
away from a trial court judge who, presumably, had more recent contact with juries than Holmes did 
as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70. 
 17. 292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
 18. Compare Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70 (removing decisional authority from the jury), with 
Pokora, 292 U.S. at 100-01 (referring the question of whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
to the jury). 
 19. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69-70. 
 20. Id. 
 21. As so often in Cardozo‘s opinions, his overruling of Goodman was couched in 
terminology and principles that suggested elaboration rather than overruling: 
There is no doubt that the opinion in that case is correct in its result. Goodman, the 
driver, traveling only five or six miles an hour, had, before reaching the track, a clear 
space of eighteen feet within which the train was plainly visible. With that opportunity, 
he fell short of the legal standard of duty established for a traveler when he failed to look 
and see. This was decisive of the case. But the court did not stop there. It added a remark, 
unnecessary upon the facts before it, which has been a fertile source of controversy. ―In 
such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train 
is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will 
not often be required to do more than to stop and look.‖ 
Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102 (footnote omitted) (quoting Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70). 
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between ―rules‖ against ―standards‖22—and occasionally between 
judicial ―minimalism‖ and ―maximalism‖).23 The purpose of this Article, 
however, is not to engage those particular debates directly. Instead, this 
Article offers two separate kinds of analysis. First, it highlights areas (in 
Part III) where arguments about certainty are simply irrelevant, or at 
least where the rhetoric of certainty outstrips the substantive 
applicability of certainty-related arguments. Second, it critiques (in the 
rest of the Article) a series of broad arguments based in philosophy, 
political theory, and economics. These arguments all promote a very 
general kind of certainty, and I believe they are all mistaken. My 
argument is not that certainty is never desirable, only that it is often 
overplayed as a goal of law and jurisprudence. 
One reason I want to sidestep the discussion of rules and standards, 
and of judicial minimalism and judicial maximalism, is that those 
debates tend to be too general for particular application to the common 
law. To put it bluntly, it is difficult to decide concrete common law 
questions based on general propositions about a judge‘s political role or 
abstract conclusions about how specific common law rules ought to be. 
The enterprise is appropriately more pragmatic than abstract reasoning 
permits. 
To be clear, this Article‘s argument is not specifically for standards 
over rules or for any particular thesis about the role of judges. Standards 
indeed tend to be less ―certain‖ than rules under my definition, but the 
distinction between rules and standards does not exhaust the questions of 
certainty with which I am concerned. Consider, as an example, the rule 
in contract law that donative promises are not enforceable unless the 
promisee relies on them.
24
 In the vast majority of cases, this rule is 
relatively simple to apply, and it is not prone to especially unpredictable 
application; it is a ―rule‖ rather than a ―standard.‖ It can be set in 
opposition, for instance, to a more general standard like ―donative 
promises are enforceable where justice requires.‖ Nonetheless, certainty 
and predictability are likely not significant goals of the rule, and it is 
difficult to evaluate the rule by evaluating its certainty. For one thing, 
                                                          
 22. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-83 (1985). 
 23. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 3-4 (1999); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2009) (describing ―minimalism‖ in this context as ―a term coined by Cass 
Sunstein‖). Related terms, of course, have a long and interesting history in legal and political 
commentary; for example, Jeremy Bentham self-consciously created the terms ―minimize‖ and 
―maximize.‖ See JEREMY BENTHAM, PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION 103 n.* (London, Jeremy Bentham 1817); see also 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 497, 815 (2d ed. 1989).  
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a, illus. (1979). 
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promisors would be on shaky moral ground if they were to insist that the 
law guarantee that their promises were not enforceable, even after 
having created the impression to promisees that the promises were 
sincere. Even more significantly, in practice, donative promisors cannot 
rely on the unenforceability of their promises, because the law will 
compensate the promisee for losses he incurs in reasonable reliance on 
the promise.
25
 And just as a rule like this can be unpredictable, standards 
can be quite predictable—if, for example, there is a clear social 
consensus that a particular kind of behavior is unreasonable. 
In any event, as those who participate in debates between rules and 
standards recognize, there is a spectrum between the two; the debate is 
not between endpoints but is, appropriately, a matter of sensitive 
degree.
26
 The terminology of ―rules‖ and ―standards‖ ignores this 
spectrum and encourages more abstraction than is warranted. 
More specifically, this Article avoids arguing for a specific amount 
of certainty or uncertainty, or for a specific mix of rules and standards, 
because many questions in the common law can benefit from focused 
analysis and the application of principles that are essentially matters of 
social consensus. A general problem from which both the 
minimalism/maximalism debate and the rule/standard debate sometimes 
suffer is that they appear to assume, at least implicitly, that the point of 
legal commentary must be only, or at least largely, to make a choice 
about the best legal response given a particular constant state of 
confusion about the right doctrinal approach. In other words, they appear 
often to start with the premise that we are substantially unsure how to 
address a particular category of cases; given that, appellate judges and 
academic commentators (who often seem to imagine themselves as 
appellate judges) must either throw up their hands in despair and refer 
the matter to a jury or trial judge or, alternatively, adopt an admittedly 
imperfect wholesale rule. 
For example, a commentator analyzing the contract-law doctrines 
concerning unexpected circumstances (such as impossibility, 
impracticability, and frustration) might consider problems in those areas 
and, from the perspective of a judicial minimalist or maximalist, make 
                                                          
 25. Id. § 90. 
 26. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 561-62 (1992). Professor Kaplow notes:  
The language of this Article will follow the common practice of referring to rules and 
standards as if one were comparing pure types, even though legal commands mix the two 
in varying degrees. One can think of the choice between rules and standards as involving 
the extent to which a given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or 
left to an enforcement authority to consider.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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respectively a pronouncement like ―the doctrine should not exist because 
it undermines the certainty of parties‘ rights and duties‖ or ―judges 
should have discretion to do justice as they see fit.‖ Perhaps we would 
have to pick one of those two approaches if we were required to give up 
further attempts to analyze the morality and policy of contract cases that 
raise unexpected-circumstances concerns, but we are almost never 
barred from increasing our reasoned understanding of particular 
categories of cases. Instead of a meta-theoretical and almost anti-
substantive debate about the right level of generality of contract-law 
rules, the debate about unexpected circumstances should proceed along 
substantive lines. Commentators should aim to categorize cases, find 
salient principles of morality and policy that distinguish some cases from 
others, and adopt other modes of reasoning that at least aim to provide 
positive-sum improvements in legal understanding rather than to allocate 
the costs of preexisting analytical confusion.
27
 If nothing else, this 
Article seeks to encourage productive analysis of substantive law rather 
than essentially distributive analysis about what to do given confusion 
about the best solutions to doctrinal problems.
28
 
                                                          
 27. For an example of an article that engages in precisely this sort of positive-sum 
improvement in analytical methods in the context of unexpected circumstances, see generally 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207 
(2009). The discussion in the text is in some ways an answer to the challenge that Robert Scott and 
Alan Schwartz pose regarding the difficulties of pluralist legal theories—that they ―tend to be least 
helpful when they are most needed,‖ Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 542-43 n.2, because they 
are most needed where values are in conflict and a weighing of them is necessary. Developing legal 
rules is indeed often difficult precisely because it puts our values in conflict—for example, because 
it pits efficiency against morality—or because it sets the interests of different groups of people in 
conflict. But addressing these difficulties without considering the conflicting substantive values 
tends to misfire precisely because it does not address the root of the difficulties. Problems remain 
difficult until we resolve or at least address conflict, either through reasoning or through an 
acceptable political process. And some problems may remain difficult indefinitely. My view is that 
this is better than pretending that difficult problems are easy. 
 28. Thus, for example, I perhaps share some of the frustration expressed by Professor Schlag: 
Much of legal argument tracks the dialectic. This dialectic cannot be anchored in matters 
of substance. Indeed, the very attempt to explain this aspect of form in terms of 
substance succeeds in doing quite the reverse: It puts us on the road to explaining 
substance by means of form. The short of it is that much of legal argumentation is simply 
an exercise in the formalistic mechanics of a dialectic which doesn‘t go anywhere. The 
point of further study ought to be to ascertain why and how it is that we allow such silly 
games to have such serious consequences.  
Schlag, supra note 22, at 430. But I believe I am more optimistic than Professor Schlag when it 
comes to the role of context-sensitive analysis. As exemplified in Mel Eisenberg‘s work, see, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 27, my belief is that sensitive analysis of cases and categories in common law 
subjects can shed meaningful light on solutions to complex problems. 
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III. CONTEXTUALLY IRRELEVANT CERTAINTY 
Surprisingly often, courts and commentators urge certainty in areas 
where it is almost entirely unjustified by any notion of morality or 
efficiency—or, indeed, where the certainty of a legal rule has essentially 
no consequences at all on its own.
29
 To put it differently, a surprisingly 
common pattern in legal argumentation is the assertion that some course 
of action would promote uncertainty and is undesirable on that basis 
alone, when in fact it is virtually impossible to discern any plausible 
moral or instrumental detriment from the claimed uncertainty. This is 
not, again, to say that uncertainty is desirable on its own, but only that 
the claimed certainty provides no social advantages—and thus that 
whatever legal question is being asked should be decided on other 
grounds. 
As a rough analogy, it is easy to see how a chess player is wronged 
if tournament authorities change the rules of chess in the middle of a 
game. It is also easy to speak in generalities based on this example and 
to make a claim like: ―The proper administration of chess tournaments 
requires certainty, because the very point of the tournament is to test 
players‘ ability to compete according to particular rules; their 
strategizing is pointless without reliable rules.‖ This generalization 
carries a good degree of sense, particularly with regard to the kinds of 
certainty that those who state it would probably have in mind, like 
sudden, pointless changes to the rules of chess. It would be wrong to 
take this call for certainty, however, to extend to the precise color of the 
pieces on the chessboard or the precise location of the games in the 
tournament. A player might feel at most inconvenienced, but not 
wronged, to be told that because of a water leak, a scheduled game had 
been moved to the second floor instead of the third floor of a building. 
The only way to distinguish the cases in which certainty is relevant from 
those in which it is not is by considering the context of any proposed 
change through the lens of substantive considerations—that is, those 
concerned with morality, planning, and so on. The reason that a move 
from Room 203 to Room 303 does not matter is that it does not defeat 
players‘ reasonable strategic planning in the way that a reduction in the 
number of pawns, or a material decrease in the time allowed for play, 
does. The proper resolution of borderline cases, like the size or 
abstractness of the pieces‘ shapes or the permitted amount of background 
noise during gameplay, depends on the same substantive concerns, as 
 
                                                          
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
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filtered through propositions of practical experience. Certainty itself is 
not the final goal; it is a way of achieving particular substantive goals. 
The same is true of law, and the same generalization in law—that 
certainty is always or generally demanded by order or planning or some 
other singular factor—is wrong for the same reasons. This Part illustrates 
the problem over several categories of cases. The central argument in 
this Part is that any argument for certainty needs to be evaluated with 
respect to its context and ultimately justified (or rejected) using 
particular notions of morality, efficiency, or some other substantive 
social proposition.
30
 Because it is difficult to show the importance of 
context in the abstract, the discussion in this Part walks through several 
categories of examples of arguments in which the context is forgotten or 
ignored. The point is to suggest the importance of a focused analysis of 
legal certainty. 
Broadly speaking, this Part highlights categories of cases in which 
one or both of the following properties is true: (1) no parties will in fact 
benefit from any claimed certainty, because the factual situations 
governed by the legal rule at stake do not engender reliance or planning, 
either because they are unexpected or because reliance is not valuable or 
appropriate in particular contexts; (2) any parties who seek certainty can 
easily achieve it using a mechanism that complements the legal rule at 
issue in the particular contexts in which the rule applies. For ease of 
exposition, however, the Part is organized as follows: First, I discuss the 
supposed certainty that comes from doctrinal stability. Second, I discuss 
the certainty associated with substantive common law rules themselves. 
A. Irrelevant Doctrinal Stability 
Doctrinal stability can be a weighty goal, but only where it matters. 
The chief reason doctrinal stability matters is that parties might rely on 
existing doctrine in planning their affairs.
31
 Productive and fair reliance 
on doctrine is a serious consideration that needs to be weighed against 
other serious considerations, such as the improvement that might come 
from a new, superior rule.
32
 
 
                                                          
 30. As a background matter, I take it as a basic premise of the modern analysis of common 
law that common law principles must be justified at bottom by morality, policy, and experience. See 
NATURE OF COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 43. 
 31. See id. at 48 (―[S]tare decisis makes planning on the basis of law more reliable and private 
dispute-settlement on the basis of law easier. The most salient aspect of this role of stare decisis is 
the protection of justifiable reliance.‖). 
 32. For a discussion of the overruling of precedent, see id. ch. 7.  
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My argument here is not that doctrinal stability is never desirable;
33
 
it is just that such stability is often overplayed, and that it needs to be 
evaluated in view of the particular reliance it permits in the real world. 
Often, to the contrary, doctrinal certainty is claimed as a good thing in 
itself,
34
 either explicitly or—because no particular benefit from doctrinal 
certainty is stated—implicitly. 
There is perhaps one general way in which doctrinal stability may 
indeed be a good thing in itself, without any context-specific benefit: 
Overturning doctrine in one area may conceivably signal to private 
parties that legal doctrine as a whole is not as certain as they thought. As 
a result, overruling of precedent may undermine general planning. Mel 
Eisenberg treats this possibility as a form of what he calls ―general 
reliance‖ on legal doctrine: courts ―may be concerned that failure to 
follow [a particular] precedent [at issue] may be likely to make actors 
insecure about the reliability of other precedents.‖35 I am skeptical, 
however, that general reliance of this type is an especially weighty 
consideration in the real world for the simple reason that if courts can 
reliably identify cases in which specific reliance is impossible and 
consider precedent less weighty in those areas, those following the 
courts‘ decisions have little reason to fear that precedent will be 
compromised in cases where reliance is plausible. 
To elaborate this argument, it will be helpful to consider an 
example. Despite its age, the classic English contract case of Foakes v. 
Beer
36
 is a useful example, because it exhibits very clearly (1) an 
undesirable precedent, and (2) a decision that rests almost entirely on a 
hollow appeal to the certainty of doctrinal stability. When examined 
carefully, it serves as a demonstration of the importance of context-
sensitive analyses of certainty in legal reasoning. Cases of the type in 
Foakes—a recurring pattern in contract cases—present a situation in 
which doctrinal stability is almost entirely irrelevant because it can lead 
to no fair or useful reliance or planning. 
The facts of Foakes were relatively straightforward. After Julia 
Beer had received a judgment of a little more than £2090 against John 
Weston Foakes, the two parties entered into an agreement that modified 
the schedule and terms on which Dr. Foakes would pay the judgment.
37
 
                                                          
 33. For example, I would not seriously suggest undermining the certainty of the free 
civilmoign system. Cf., e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 616, 638-39 (1949). 
 34. See NATURE OF COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 47-48. 
 35. Id. at 48. 
 36. [1884] 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.).  
 37. Id. at 605. 
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Specifically, Dr. Foakes agreed to make a present payment of £500 and 
future installments of £150 every six months until the original sum was 
paid off, and Ms. Beer agreed to accept that stream of payments as 
satisfaction of the judgment.
38
 
This agreement ran afoul of a formal rule of classical contract law
39
 
known as the legal-duty rule. The force of the legal-duty rule is that a 
promise to discharge an existing legal obligation cannot serve as 
consideration for a promise given in exchange.
40
 For example, suppose A 
already owes B $4500, and A promises to pay that preexisting debt in 
exchange for a promise of something new from B. (Suppose B offers 
something new to induce A to live up to his existing obligation and pay 
the debt.) Under the classical legal-duty rule, A‘s promise to pay the 
existing debt does not serve as valid consideration for the new bargain 
between A and B, and that new bargain will, accordingly, not be 
enforced (at least, not without some other, independent reason for 
enforcement). 
The new arrangement between Dr. Foakes and Ms. Beer implicated 
the legal-duty rule because, in promising to pay £500 followed by 
installment payments of £150, Dr. Foakes was promising to do 
something he already had a legal obligation to do—namely, to pay Ms. 
Beer £2090 in total.
41
 Ms. Beer, on the other hand, gave something up 
under the new contract; specifically, she agreed to accept total payments 
of £2090 to satisfy her debt, thereby forgoing her right to interest 
payments.
42
 
The case arose because Ms. Beer sought to rescind the agreement 
and insist on her original rights to interest payments.
43
 In the House of 
Lords, the Earl of Selborne, Lord Chancellor, disposed of the case 
largely on doctrinal grounds, observing that regardless of the legal-duty 
rule‘s merits, it was too late in history to change the doctrine: 
The doctrine itself, as laid down by Sir Edward Coke, may have been 
criticised, as questionable in principle by some persons whose opinions 
are entitled to respect, but it has never been judicially overruled; on the 
contrary I think it has always, since the sixteenth century, been 
accepted as law. If so, I cannot think that your Lordships would do 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 605-06. 
 39. I use the term ―classical contract law‖ to refer to the historical formal body of rules 
consistent with Samuel Williston‘s analyses and the original Restatement of Contracts. See P.S. 
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 405-06 (1979); NATURE OF COMMON 
LAW, supra note 9, at 78. 
 40. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 76 (1932). 
 41. See Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 605-06. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 606. 
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right, if you were now to reverse, as erroneous, a judgment of the Court 
of Appeal, proceeding upon a doctrine which has been accepted as part 
of the law of England for 280 years.
44
 
What is striking about Lord Selborne‘s doctrinal, stability-oriented 
defense of the legal-duty rule is how poorly it addresses the 
circumstances in which that rule operates. It does not indicate how the 
parties might have relied on the existing rule, how they would be harmed 
if the rule were to change, or why in context it matters how long the rule 
has been ―accepted.‖ 
To be clear, I reiterate that doctrinal stability can be an important 
consideration in deciding legal cases. When parties have relied on legal 
rules, it can be unfair and might potentially disrupt their ability to plan 
for the future efficiently if the rules change suddenly, without notice, for 
no good reason. The frustration of planning should count at least as a 
reason, though not necessarily a decisive reason, to avoid changes that 
disrupt settled doctrine. But as Lord Selborne‘s analysis in Foakes 
suggests, courts and commentators often appeal to doctrinal stability 
without regard for the role that stability might play—or not play—in 
particular cases. 
Consider, to begin with, that the practical force of the legal-duty 
rule is to prevent some kinds of contract modifications.
45
 As a result, we 
might expect that if parties had relied on the rule, they would simply not 
have entered into modifications of contracts or debts. If Dr. Foakes and 
Ms. Beer were both honest negotiators, both fully aware of the legal-
duty rule, and both certain that the rule was an unshakeable part of the 
legal regime that governed them, then their only plausible actions in 
reliance on the rule would have been either: (1) to recognize that the rule 
takes away a potentially valuable opportunity to modify their debt and 
resign themselves, accordingly, to the terms of the original debt, or (2) to 
find some technical way to escape the force of the rule.
46
 
Importantly, the parties took neither of these paths. That is, they 
attempted to modify their contract without using any special 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 612. 
 45. The rule itself is questionable on substantive grounds and has been significantly eroded 
under modern law; if it ever served a useful role, it was probably as a crude proxy for a rule striking 
down unconscionable contracts in a legal system that did not yet have such a rule. See NATURE OF 
COMMON LAW, supra note 9, at 117-18, 155-56; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in 
Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1034-41 (1998). 
 46. For example, as a matter of substantive contract law in late nineteenth-century England, 
the parties might have avoided the force of the legal-duty rule by using the formality of the ―seal‖ to 
ensure the enforceability of their promise. See Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 611. They might also have 
attempted to have Dr. Foakes provide some form of nominal consideration to Ms. Beer. See id. at 
611-12. 
66 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:53 
technicalities to avoid the force of the legal-duty rule.
47
 That attempt 
alone makes it hard to say that Dr. Foakes and Ms. Beer relied on the 
legal-duty rule—or that future parties similarly situated will rely on the 
rule, at least if they are honest. 
Of course, not everyone is honest. Thus, another possibility is that 
Ms. Beer knew about the legal-duty rule and Dr. Foakes did not, so that 
she attempted to get him to comply with a payment schedule by offering 
a modification that she knew would be unenforceable. In that case, 
however, it becomes difficult to develop either a moral or a policy-based 
rationale to support the application of the legal-duty rule, or a more 
general principle of doctrinal stability, to Foakes. If Ms. Beer knew her 
promise to modify the debt was unenforceable, and if she was simply 
attempting to mislead Dr. Foakes to encourage him to pay his debt 
(rather than, for example, to declare bankruptcy), it would have been 
immoral for her to make that promise. Indeed, it would probably amount 
to promissory fraud.
48
 To put it differently, Ms. Beer could indeed have 
relied on the legal-duty rule when agreeing to restructure Dr. Foakes‘s 
debt, but only if she were relying on the rule specifically to deceive Dr. 
Foakes. If that is the sort of reliance that the rule permits, then doctrinal 
stability becomes simply an excuse for fraud (or, at the very least, sharp 
and unfair dealing)—and all the moral and instrumental problems 
associated with fraud. 
Another possibility is that neither of the parties knew about the 
legal-duty rule. Indeed, this seems most likely under the circumstances, 
particularly if we give Ms. Beer the moral benefit of the doubt. In that 
case, of course, the parties‘ ignorance of the rule would suggest they did 
not rely on it at all and, accordingly, that they would not be harmed if the 
doctrine were overturned. 
A final possible mechanism for reliance on the existing legal-duty 
rule remains, which is that in whatever transaction originally led to the 
£2090 debt, the parties at least implicitly relied on the future operation of 
the legal-duty rule to refuse to allow modifications to that debt. To put it 
differently, when parties enter into a contract (or otherwise do anything 
that results in the possibility of a legal duty), they might theoretically set 
the price or other terms of the contract (or otherwise adjust their activity) 
in the shadow of the legal-duty rule, secure in the knowledge that the 
rule will prevent various types of contractual modifications from taking  
 
                                                          
 47. See id. at 605-06. 
 48. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
507, 522-24. 
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effect. But this sort of reliance is extremely unlikely for the following 
two reasons. 
First, though probably less importantly, the legal-duty rule does not 
apply only to contract modifications.
49
 For example, it would have 
applied if Ms. Beer‘s judgment against Dr. Foakes had been for medical 
malpractice rather than, as it was, the result of a commercial dispute.
50
 
Had the debt arisen in tort, it is implausible that the parties relied on the 
legal-duty rule at the time the initial debt was established. The court 
could, at least theoretically, have set the initial judgment with the legal-
duty rule in mind, although in practice such specific reliance seems 
unlikely. 
Second, more decisively, under English law at the time, the legal-
duty rule did not prevent all modifications to debts or contracts; it 
prevented only modifications that failed to observe other technical 
requirements of contract law, like the seal—originally a stamp of hot 
wax or something similar to authenticate a document and serve as 
evidence of the deliberation behind and solemnity of a legal 
undertaking.
51
 (In Foakes, the parties‘ agreement to structure a 
settlement of Dr. Foakes‘s debt was not made under seal.)52 Other 
mechanisms could have made the agreement to modify the debt 
unambiguously enforceable.
53
 Accordingly, Ms. Beer (or the judge that 
issued her order) could not have relied on a guarantee, backed by the 
stability of legal doctrine, that her original debt could not be modified; 
there were indeed many ways in which it could have been modified. 
That the legal-duty rule prevented one of those ways would almost 
certainly have been of exceedingly little or no value, practical or 
otherwise, to her or anyone else at the time the initial debt came into 
effect. 
While Foakes may be distinctive in presenting such a clear 
combination of a bad rule and an adherence to that rule for uncompelling 
reasons of doctrinal stability, significant domains of the common law 
                                                          
 49. See Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 610-12. 
 50. See id.; see also Beer v. Foakes, [1883] 11 Q.B. 221, 221 (―In August, 1875, the plaintiff 
recovered judgment against the defendant for 2090l. in an action on certain bills of exchange 
accepted by the defendant.‖). 
 51. See Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 611; Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. 
REV. 799, 800-01 (1941) (discussing the seal and its formal role in contract law). 
 52. Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 611 (―Not being under seal, it cannot be legally enforced against 
the respondent, unless she received consideration for it from the appellant . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 53. See id. (recognizing that a modification is enforceable if, ―though without consideration, it 
operates by way of accord and satisfaction, so as to extinguish the [original] claim for interest‖). 
Moreover, Ms. Beer could, at some point during the operation of the newly agreed payment 
schedule, simply have given Dr. Foakes an executed gift in the amount of the interest. 
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have characteristics similar to the pattern presented in that case. 
Specifically, there are many instances in which productive reliance on 
existing doctrine is impossible, or at least that the capacity for it is 
grossly exaggerated. For example, in contract-law cases involving 
unexpected circumstances, or in tort-law cases that purport to direct 
productive incentives to individuals who often have very little 
conception of the specifics of tort law,
54
 it is hard to see how justifiable 
reliance would be undermined by doctrinal evolution. 
In short, it is important to determine the reasons that doctrinal 
stability might matter in particular cases. Without a sensitive context-
specific analysis that applies substantive knowledge of the law and 
analyzes the features of particular cases to which that substantive law 
applies, it is impossible to determine precisely how important reliance is. 
B. Irrelevant Rule-Certainty 
There are two main substantive categories of cases in which the 
certainty of legal rules is overplayed and in which it should probably be 
ignored or at least significantly deemphasized. First, in many situations, 
private parties may not desire certainty from the law, because institutions 
complementary to courts (and their default rules) provide whatever 
certainty is needed. Second, in some situations, advance planning is 
either impossible or only marginally plausible. 
Roessler v. Novak
55
 nicely represents the first kind of case—and it 
serves as another example of an invocation of certainty that seems 
initially persuasive but is less practically applicable after a focused 
analysis of the factual situation. The case is not doctrinally significant, 
but it appears in at least one influential torts casebook
56
 and some torts 
scholarship by leading torts commentators because of a concurring 
opinion‘s powerfully written argument against uncertainty.57  
                                                          
 54. See Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of 
Negligence, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 707, 708 (2010) (―[I]t is common to see arguments that injurers do 
not respond to incentives in the way economists predict because people are simply not rational, are 
not aware of the law, or have more pressing concerns than distant and relatively weak financial 
incentives.‖); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 556-58 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing ―unfair surprise‖ by constructing an imaginary dialogue between a 
potential injurer under the pre-MacPherson rule of tort duty and that injurer‘s counsel, showing the 
implausibility of specific reliance on the older rule). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the 
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) 
(surveying the state of arguments that tort law does not influence behavior in the way economists 
suggest).  
 55. 858 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 56. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24-28. 
 57. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 13, at 441-42. 
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The facts of the case are straightforward.
58
 Based on abdominal 
scans, a radiologist diagnosed the plaintiff, Klaus Roessler, with visceral 
perforation—a serious condition requiring immediate surgery.59 The 
surgery led to significant complications, including renal failure and brain 
abscesses; these required Mr. Roessler to spend about two months in the 
hospital.
60
 His lawsuit alleged that the radiologist had misinterpreted the 
abdominal scans and was negligent in failing to consider the possibility 
of an abdominal abscess,
61
 evidently a much less significant condition 
that would not have required immediate surgery. He sued (among other 
parties) the radiologist who diagnosed him, the radiological group in 
which that radiologist was employed, and the hospital where the 
radiologist worked.
62
 
The question on appeal concerned the vicarious liability of the 
hospital.
63
 The hospital claimed that the negligent radiologist was not its 
employee; he was merely an employee of the radiology group, which 
was in turn an independent contractor of the hospital.
64
 The appellate 
court nonetheless reversed the trial court‘s grant of the hospital‘s 
summary judgment motion, finding that even if the radiologist was not 
the hospital‘s employee, the jury could have found that he acted with the 
―apparent authority‖ of the hospital.65 This use of the concept of 
apparent authority may be confusing to those aware of agency law.
66
 The 
                                                          
 58. See Roessler, 858 So. 2d. at 1160. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 1158-62. 
 63. Id. at 1160-61. 
 64. Id. at 1161-62. 
 65. Id. at 1162-63. 
 66. The terminology of apparent authority is normally used in a contractual or at least 
transactional setting as a description of the power of someone who is not an agent to bind a principal 
because of manifestations the principal has made about the agent‘s contractual authority. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958) (―Apparent authority is the power to affect the 
legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the 
other, arising from and in accordance with the other‘s manifestations to such third persons.‖). The 
Restatement (Second) of Agency also provides:  
[A]pparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken 
words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the 
third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by 
the person purporting to act for him.  
Id. § 267. In agency law, there is a separate concept of an ―apparent servant,‖ or one who is held out 
to be a servant (for the purposes of vicarious liability in tort law) even though he or she is not:  
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third 
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to 
liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one 
appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.  
Id. The Roessler court appears to have applied the latter principle, though its terminology is unclear. 
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case is easier to understand in view of the principle of vicarious liability 
in tort law that the negligence of those held out to be employees can be 
treated as employees by those who rely on their employment status, as a 
patient might when evaluating the medical advice of a doctor in a 
hospital.
67
 This concept is similar to, but not the same as, the traditional 
agency concept of apparent authority.
68
 
For our purposes, the holding of the case is not particularly 
important; the case has entered teaching and scholarship because of the 
fiery concurring opinion of Chief Judge Altenbernd, which criticizes the 
approach of the majority because it is uncertain: 
I concur because precedent requires me to do so. I believe, however, 
that our twenty-year experiment with the use of apparent agency as a 
doctrine to determine a hospital‘s vicarious liability for the acts of 
various independent contractors has been a failure. Patients, hospitals, 
doctors, nurses, other licensed professionals, risk managers for 
governmental agencies, and insurance companies all need to have 
predictable general rules establishing the parameters of vicarious 
liability in this situation. Utilizing case-specific decisions by 
individually selected juries to determine whether a hospital is or is not 
vicariously liable for the mistakes of a radiology department, an 
emergency room, or some other corporate entity that has been created 
as an independent contractor to provide necessary services within the 
hospital is inefficient, unpredictable and, perhaps most important, a 
source of avoidable litigation. Our society can undoubtedly function 
well and provide insurance coverage to protect the risks of malpractice 
if there is either broad liability upon the hospital for these services as 
nondelegable duties or if liability is restricted to the independent 
contractor. The uncertainty of the current system, however, does not 
work. The supreme court or the legislature needs to simplify the rules 
of liability in this area.
69
 
To evaluate this argument, it is important to understand what 
specific consequences result from an imposition of vicarious liability, or 
not, in cases like Roessler. Crucially, the rule at issue does not dictate 
which of the various defendants will ultimately be left with the economic 
responsibility for the plaintiff‘s loss; that is, it does not dictate the 
incidence of that liability. Vicarious liability simply provides the 
plaintiff with a potential option for direct recovery from parties other 
than those who have directly wronged him.
70
 Because of the likelihood 
                                                          
 67. See Roessler, 858 So. 2d. at 1162-63. 
 68. See supra note 66. 
 69. Roessler, 858 So. 2d. at 1163 (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring). 
 70. See id. at 1161 (majority opinion). 
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of indemnification and contribution consequent to the plaintiff‘s 
judgment, the certainty of the liability rule at stake in Roessler becomes 
economically irrelevant in many real cases. 
To see why, it is important to recognize that doctors are generally 
liable for their malpractice regardless of vicarious-liability rules.
71
 Rules 
of respondeat superior merely hold their employers—in this case, the 
radiology group for which the allegedly negligent radiologist worked—
liable as well.
72
 
That is, the existence of vicarious-liability rules does not ordinarily 
prevent a plaintiff from recovering against a wrongdoer; vicarious-
liability rules simply provide opportunities to recover from other 
parties.
73
 Likewise, the possibility of recovery against a third-party non-
employer who has held out an independent contractor as an employee (as 
the court allowed for in Roessler) does not ordinarily prevent a plaintiff 
from recovering from a wrongdoer‘s employer.74 
Accordingly, from the perspective of the doctor and the radiology 
group, little or no practical certainty is to be gained from a definite rather 
than an uncertain rule in cases like Roessler. The doctor knows he may 
be liable for his own negligence, and his employer knows that it may be 
liable for its employee‘s negligence. They will each almost certainly 
carry insurance, and the premium they pay will account for the 
possibility of their liability. And if they do not carry insurance, they each 
know that they face the risk of enough liability to bankrupt them. 
Accordingly, even Judge Altenbernd‘s proposed rule would probably not 
bring the doctor and his employer greater certainty in practice. At the  
 
                                                          
 71. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.10(3) (2d ed. 1993). As Dobbs puts it: 
Indemnity issues (and similar issues of contribution) commonly arise in tort cases. In the 
traditional tort case, one person is primarily responsible for an injury to a victim, but 
another person is actually held liable to the victim (or settles the victim‘s full claim). For 
example, a victim might be negligently injured by A‘s employee acting in the scope of 
his employment. If the victim recovers from A on the basis of vicarious liability, A is 
entitled to indemnity from the employee. Or a seaman is injured in the service of the ship 
so that the ship is strictly liable to pay for medical attention and support. If the injury was 
negligently caused by T, then the ship, having paid the obligation that should fall 
primarily on the negligent person, is entitled to indemnity. In such cases it is easy to find 
a right of indemnity in favor of one who is held strictly liable for practical reasons and 
against one who is actually negligent, and indemnity of this kind carries with it the 
recovery of attorney fees incurred. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 72. Roessler, 858 So. 2d. at 1162 (noting that the radiologist ―was an employee of SMH 
Radiology on the date he interpreted Mr. Roessler‘s scans‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
 73. See supra note 71. 
 74. See supra note 71. 
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start, then, we have ruled out many of the potential beneficiaries of 
certainty that Judge Altenbernd listed. 
It might seem, however, that at least the hospital will care about the 
certainty of the vicarious-liability rules imposed on it; that is, most of the 
force of Judge Altenbernd‘s argument in favor of certainty would seem 
to apply to the hospital and its insurer. Even to the hospital, however, the 
importance of certainty may be illusory. 
To begin with, the certainty of the vicarious-liability rule at stake 
affects only whether the plaintiff can recover directly from the hospital. 
Ordinarily, the hospital (and its insurer) can seek reimbursement from 
the radiology group (and its insurer)—and, at least in theory, from the 
doctor (and his or her insurer) as well—for any judgments they pay to 
the plaintiff.
75
 As above, the availability of vicarious liability does not 
ordinarily exonerate the wrongdoer or those closest to the wrongdoer.
76
 
To put it differently, the certainty that Judge Altenbernd proposes 
seems, ultimately, to implicate only the certainty in allocating liability 
among the doctor, his employer, his hospital, and their various insurers.
77
 
But default rules of contribution and indemnification already go a long 
way toward providing certainty to those parties about that particular 
allocation, regardless of whether the plaintiff can include the hospital as 
an additional defendant. 
Of course, if the plaintiff can recover against the hospital, the 
hospital may conceivably face—if nothing else—litigation costs 
(although indemnification usually addresses this concern as well). But as 
to these and any other costs, the hospital—and generally speaking, all 
insurers with a stake in the outcome of cases like Roessler—can easily 
achieve whatever greater certainty they desire by simply contracting 
with one another for it. Again, it is worth emphasizing that all that is 
usually at stake in a case like Roessler is allocation of liability among 
contractually related insurers, not the presence of liability in the first 
instance. 
Regardless of whether the plaintiff has a 0% chance, a 20% chance, 
a 50% chance, or a 100% chance of being able to receive a judgment 
from the hospital in cases like Roessler—or indeed regardless of whether 
the likelihood of such a judgment is simply uncertain and unknown
78—
                                                          
 75. See DOBBS, supra note 71, at § 3.10(3). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 78. For a discussion of the differences between probability and uncertainty, see Shawn J. 
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the hospital and the radiology group (or again, more likely, their 
insurers) can easily allocate the ultimate responsibility for the plaintiff‘s 
loss however they see fit, and they can provide among themselves 
whatever simplified dispute-resolution procedures they desire to reduce 
or substantially eliminate litigation costs.
79
 Doing this eliminates the 
importance of certainty in the default vicarious-liability rule. 
Note that the barriers parties face in shifting the incidence of 
liability by contract is not high in this case; in all likelihood, it would 
amount to little more than a standard form term inserted into a contract 
between sophisticated insurers. In some sense, then, this observation is 
just an application of the Coase Theorem to demonstrate that the 
underlying legal rule in a given area does not reduce costs when the 
transaction costs faced by those who would bargain around it are low.
80
 
But if so, it is a useful specific application of that theorem for two 
reasons.  
First, it is important to recognize that the Coase Theorem (contrary, 
perhaps, to the way it is often conceived) need not require certainty in 
underlying legal rules. To the extent the Coase Theorem applies to a 
situation, it diminishes the importance not just of the particular 
substantive legal decisions at issue, but also of their certainty. Thus, for 
example, a Coasean railroad that might burn down a cornfield can still, 
in all likelihood, negotiate with the cornfield owner even where neither 
of the parties knows the precise standard of reasonableness in tort law 
that will govern them.
81
 To my knowledge, this point has rarely, if ever, 
been made, and the rhetorical power of appeals to certainty suggests it is 
not widely understood. 
Second, the Coase Theorem is particularly helpful in contexts 
where a legal rule is urged to benefit sophisticated parties already in a 
contractual relationship with each other, like the various insurers 
covering different activities within the same hospital. To put it 
differently, it rings hollow to call for certainty on behalf of parties who 
do not need it because they could trivially achieve it on their own (and 
might already have done so).
82
 
Moreover, the need for certainty in cases like Roessler is 
diminished by the fact that insurers are in the business of addressing risk 
                                                          
 79. As a matter of casual empiricism, insurers seem very likely to at least consider the 
possibility of contribution and indemnification in this context, though I am unaware of hard 
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 80. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1 
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in the first place. Presumably, what matters to them most is the aggregate 
imposition of liability. Certainty in particular cases is likely irrelevant in 
the long run. 
The matter is little different from the plaintiff‘s perspective. The 
plaintiff will be able to recover as long as the doctor and his or her 
employer are either solvent or insured, which covers nearly all cases of 
hospital-based doctors. From the plaintiff‘s perspective, the underlying 
vicarious-liability rule concerning hospitals does not add any 
uncertainty—even if the rule itself is entirely unpredictable—unless all 
of the following are true: (1) the negligent doctor is uninsured; (2) the 
negligent doctor is insolvent; (3) the doctor‘s direct employer carries no 
insurance; (4) that direct employer is, itself, insolvent too; and (5) 
notwithstanding (1) through (4), the hospital is either solvent or 
insured.
83
 In most cases of hospital-based care, it is dramatically unlikely 
that these five possibilities are all true. 
In my view, Judge Altenbernd‘s opinion is at its strongest when 
referring to the costs of litigation.
84
 Surely it can be wasteful to litigate 
the hospital‘s liability, even if the ultimate incidence of that liability is 
likely to be shifted elsewhere. Indeed, it is somewhat hard for me to 
explain—if everything I have said is true—precisely why the particular 
issue that Judge Altenbernd‘s panel decided was appealed in the first 
place. Possibly the hospital was simply seeking to remove itself from the 
case at the earliest opportunity to avoid further litigation costs. If so, and 
if this was indeed a recurring pattern, it could have diminished these 
costs in the future with a smarter contract with the radiologists‘ insurer. 
Possibly the hospital was not confident in the practice group‘s (or its 
insurer‘s) solvency, though there too, it can prevent that problem in the 
future—and again, achieve certainty if it truly desires it—using 
contractual means. In any event, regardless of the hospital‘s reason for 
litigating this case, any benefit of a more certain rule to parties in the 
hospital‘s position remains elusive. 
More generally, of course, just because litigation can be wasteful 
doesn‘t mean that it is. I do not necessarily disagree with Judge 
Altenbernd that cases like Roessler should not be litigated or appealed—
but whether that is true or not depends on a weighing of the relative costs 
and relative benefits of a less sensitive rule. To put it differently, even if 
it were easier to identify a clear beneficiary of a more certain rule in 
                                                          
 83. To the contrary, it is typical for states to require physicians to demonstrate financial 
responsibility or obtain insurance. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320 (West 2007). Admittedly, 
these statutes are imperfect and plausible claims may often exceed the amounts they require. 
 84. See Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Altenbernd, 
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cases like Roessler, the mere presence of that benefit is not decisive; the 
benefit must be weighed against what are essentially the costs of error 
that arise from a less nuanced rule. 
The other major category of cases in which rule-certainty is 
overplayed is that where the parties cannot rely on a legal rule, however 
certain or uncertain it may be. For example, perhaps they simply do not 
know about the rule; for the same reasons that doctrinal stability is likely 
not significant in such areas,
85
 the certainty that a rule provides may be 
irrelevant when parties cannot factor it into their advance planning. For 
example, if someone does not know about the rule in many states that 
she may be vicariously liable for the negligence of a driver who drives 
her car,
86
 the potential uncertainty of that rule (for example, if it were 
inconsistently applied) is likely irrelevant to her, because it did not affect 
her planning. A separate reason that reliance may not be important is that 
a rule covers only unexpected conditions—as do, for example, rules 
concerning frustration and impossibility in contract law.
87
 Given that 
these rules specifically address unexpected conditions, the notion that 
parties are harmed by additional uncertainty in the rules themselves is 
implausible in most cases.
88
 
Similarly, as I will later discuss, in many cases parties do not care 
about the certainty of a legal rule, only about the predictability of a 
result in the real world.
89
 I leave a fuller discussion of that topic to the 
next section. 
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IV. DERIVATIONS OF CERTAINTY‘S IMPORTANCE  
FROM THE NATURE OR PURPOSE OF LAW 
A. Law as Coordination 
Larry Alexander has offered an influential formal view of law that 
highlights law‘s ability to coordinate behavior. Based in part on 
philosopher Gregory Kavka‘s insights that even morally perfect people 
would need governments,
90
 Professor Alexander offers the evocative 
observation ―that the problem law is meant to solve is that of 
information, not immoral motivation—that men are not gods, rather than 
that men are not angels.‖91 Others, including my colleague Curtis 
Bridgeman, have recently drawn on Professor Alexander‘s insights to 
justify formal rules in particular domains of the common law, such as 
contract law.
92
 
Alexander‘s argument is subtle and raises a variety of interesting 
problems for jurisprudence in general. For example, Alexander 
recognizes a tension between a wholly formal vision of law and more 
informal visions of morality,
93
 leading to what Alexander fears may be 
―the impossibility of law‖ itself.94 A general critique of Professor 
Alexander‘s argument is beyond the scope of this Article, however. For 
now, I want to respond only to a piece of it—specifically, to the notion 
that because one of law‘s goals is to coordinate among even well-
meaning actors, law must essentially be formalistic and must provide 
certainty (under my definitions in Part II) wherever it has an opportunity 
to do so.
95
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Alexander begins by positing a community of people who share a 
rough consensus about moral and practical propositions and who also 
will tend generally to observe those moral and practical propositions.
96
 
As Alexander puts it: ―[I]magine not that everyone in this community is 
a saint, but that everyone will honor his moral obligations as he sees 
them almost all the time. In other words, the members of this community 
are strongly motivated to act morally toward one another.‖97 The 
fundamental premise of Alexander‘s argument is that even such a 
community, ―idyllic‖98 though it may be, requires rules to coordinate 
conduct and resolve even well-meaning disagreement: 
[E]ven when they agree about the formulation of moral rights and 
duties, [people] might disagree about the facts that govern when and 
how those moral rights and duties apply. For example, although they 
may agree that no one should put dangerous pollutants in the water 
supply, they may disagree over whether a certain pesticide is a 
dangerous pollutant. Or, if they agree that those in irreversible comas 
should be regarded as ―dead,‖ they may disagree over whether a certain 
physical condition constitutes an irreversible coma.  
  These disagreements can produce considerable strife and turmoil, 
even among people of good will. Indeed, the road to the nasty, brutish, 
and short lives of the Hobbesian state of nature does not require people 
motivated solely by selfishness and predatory opportunism. Moral 
disagreement over concrete courses of conduct, coupled with the 
motivation to do the right thing, can lead to the Hobbesian state of 
affairs as expeditiously as naked self-interest.
99
 
An illustration from Alexander may be helpful. Consider, for 
example, how a speed limit might be set: 
Suppose, for example, that Agnes and Ben [two well-meaning actors in 
Professor Alexander‘s hypothetical community] are trying to decide 
how fast they should drive and they take their concern to Lex [the 
lawmaker]. They will not be satisfied if Lex promulgates any of the 
following ―rules‖ in response: ―Drive at a reasonable speed‖; ―Drive 
safely‖; ―Drive so as to maximize total social utility‖; or ―Drive 
consistently with maximum equal liberty for all.‖ They will say to Lex, 
―If we knew what was safe, or reasonable, or utility-maximizing, and 
so forth, we would not need to have you settle how fast we should 
drive; we could decide for ourselves and achieve coordination, 
expertise, and efficiency.‖ In other words, these posited norms do not 
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settle for Agnes and Ben the particular question they need to have 
settled in order to coordinate desirably and efficiently.
100
 
Given this need for coordination, Alexander concludes that 
certainty is necessarily advantageous over uncertainty: 
If Agnes and Ben . . . cannot resolve for themselves efficiently, 
expertly, and consistently the applications of the moral principles to 
which they both subscribe at a more abstract level—then they will not 
be helped by [the law‘s] promulgating standards. For the standards do 
not improve their ability to determine what they need to determine.
101
 
It is this particular conclusion that I question, for two distinct 
reasons. First, it appears to assume that one plausible purpose of law 
must be its exclusive purpose; just because coordination of behavior 
among well-meaning parties may be one function of law does not, 
however, imply that it is the only function. Indeed, coordination is useful 
only in view of more fundamental social propositions, such as morality 
or efficiency, and it is those goals that drive the evaluation of a rule‘s 
success at coordinating behavior, motivate the selection of one out of 
many rules that might coordinate behavior equally well, and mediate 
between the value of coordination (on one hand) and other goals (on the 
other).
102
 Second, certain rules do not always coordinate behavior better 
than uncertain rules; whether they do or not depends on a variety of 
context-specific factors. To put it differently, the ability of certain rather 
than uncertain rules to coordinate behavior is an empirically testable 
fact, not one that can necessarily be derived from axiomatic 
understandings of the human situation or of the attributes of possible 
legal rules. 
1.   Formalism and Certainty as the Restriction of Goals 
In previous work, I have described legal formalism as an attempt at 
a kind of ―rational ignorance‖ in analyzing law.103 On that view, legal 
formalism is characterized by its restriction of appropriate legal criteria 
to a subset of those that otherwise might matter, usually in order to 
achieve certainty or predictability.
104
 My chief response to Professor 
Alexander‘s argument is that while coordination among well-meaning 
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individuals can indeed be a plausible justification for legal rules, it is 
clearly not the only one; just because law can coordinate by providing 
certain rules does not mean that it must always do so. 
To begin with, rarely does any area of life require the optimization 
of a singular goal. In our personal lives and in most group endeavors, 
such as political deliberation, we seek to balance multiple goals. It is 
hard to see why law should be the unique exception to the pluralism that 
Mel Eisenberg has noted applies to human decision-making generally: 
Part of the human moral condition is that we hold many proper values, 
some of which will conflict in given cases. Part of the human social 
condition is that many values are relevant to the creation of a good 
world, some of which will conflict in given cases. Contract law should 
not attempt to escape these moral and social conditions. In contract 
law, as in life, all meritorious values should be taken into account, even 
if those values may sometimes conflict.
105
 
Commentary that seeks to divine a single purpose for law, or even 
for an area of law like tort law or contract law, tends to carry an air of 
argumentative circularity: nothing has justified the assumed singularity 
of purpose. Legal commentary that deduces a single purpose of law 
through a narrow interpretation of cases rings hollow in the same way it 
would seem odd to hear a foreign observer put forth an argument about 
homebuilding like the following: (1) I have studied thousands of homes 
in your country, and I have come to the conclusion that their purpose is 
to provide shelter to their occupants; this is evident from their general 
tendency to be waterproof, to provide insulation, and so forth; (2) 
unbroken walls provide better shelter than windows, which permit light 
to enter residences and also serve as suboptimal thermal insulators;  
(3) therefore, you should improve your homes by removing windows  
from them.
106
 
Admittedly, this argument about homebuilding is a caricature; I 
doubt anyone would actually offer it. But it illuminates a problem with 
goal-monism in law in that it works only if something about the context 
dictates a single purpose, as it almost never does. 
One simple interpretation—admittedly also, probably, a 
caricature—of Professor Alexander‘s argument is that whenever a 
lawmaker (such as a legislator or a common law judge) has the 
opportunity to decide between two rules, it should choose the one that is 
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more certain (under this Article‘s definitions of certainty). Clearly, such 
an approach could never get off the ground. ―No courts‖ and ―no legal 
liability‖ are extremely certain rules, yet no commentator would 
seriously believe they are desirable in all circumstances—despite Grant 
Gilmore‘s wry characterization of classical contract law as a 
manifestation of the proposition that ―no one should be liable to anyone 
for anything.‖107 Alexander, of course, doesn‘t argue for the absence of 
all liability as a way to promote certainty; indeed, given his view of law 
as coordinating the activities of largely well-meaning individuals,
108
 the 
absence of courts would presumably be strictly worse than a system of 
courts that engages in active coordination of some kind. 
But the recognition that a legal regime can be absolutely certain and 
yet undesirable, even on Alexander‘s terms, does pose what I believe is a 
significant problem for Alexander‘s argument. The total absence of 
courts is not the only example of a legal regime that is undesirable 
because of social propositions unrelated to legal certainty, such as 
concerns about the moral undesirability of letting everyone get away 
with their wrongs and the inefficiency that would arise from the 
complete absence of legal incentives. 
Consider, for example, a still fanciful but somewhat more realistic 
interpretation of Alexander‘s argument. Suppose private actors in his 
hypothetical community have constructed a two-way road and want legal 
rules to help them decide how the road can support two-way traffic. 
They find the road unusable in the absence of legal rules because some 
actors (suppose) come from the United Kingdom and some from the 
United States, so their instincts differ about the appropriate side of the 
road on which to drive. Lex, Alexander‘s hypothetical lawmaker,109 has 
available many candidate rules that are absolutely certain from a legal 
perspective and comport perfectly well with formalism and law‘s 
coordinating role. For example, Lex could say ―Drive on the right side if 
your surname starts with A–M and on the left side if your surname starts 
with N–Z. And drive no more than three miles per hour.‖ But those 
would be bad rules, even though certain, because of substantive features 
that concern roads—their safety and efficiency at various speeds and so 
on. Again, to say that a rule is desirable because it eliminates uncertainty 
presupposes that uncertainty is the only reason a rule exists, when in fact 
reducing uncertainty is just one goal that rules might serve, even in the 
hypothetical angelic but not godlike society that Alexander envisions.
110
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Even absolutely certain rules can fail because of the various potential 
social justifications for traffic rules. 
Perhaps Alexander means to suggest that certainty is a constraint 
but that within that constraint we can optimize for other goals. For 
example, given a choice between ―always drive on the left side of the 
road‖ and ―drive on the right side if your surname starts with A–M and 
on the left side if your surname starts with N–Z,‖ a lawmaker should 
choose the former because of substantive criteria. But this, too, cannot 
work in the general case: for the same reasons that rules are judged to be 
desirable or undesirable in view of substantive social criteria (like road 
safety and the efficiency of various traveling speeds), a significant 
improvement along another socially desirable axis can easily compensate 
for a trivial, or even a moderate, decrease in certainty. As an example, 
―drive at fifty-five miles per hour unless it is raining, in which case drive 
at a lower speed‖ is almost certainly more desirable a rule than ―drive at 
fifty-five miles per hour‖ (or ―drive at ten miles per hour, for that is the 
maximum speed that is safe in all generally prevailing weather 
conditions‖); similarly, ―drive at fifty-five miles per hour unless you can 
justify a greater speed consistent with relatively safe conduct because of 
a life-threatening emergency‖ is probably more desirable than an 
absolutely fixed speed limit, although some of the details  
may be debatable based on empirical evidence and other socially 
relevant criteria. 
There is a different way to state this objection to Alexander‘s 
argument: even if we assume that coordination among private actors is 
the paramount goal of law, that does not imply (either logically or 
practically) that law must always coordinate. That is, even putting aside 
(for the sake of argument) other social justifications for law, ignoring 
other ways to evaluate law, and assuming that coordination is often 
important, coordination may still not always be needed. Recall 
Alexander‘s hypothetical citizens‘ objections to a rule of law that was 
not entirely certain: ―If we knew what was safe, or reasonable, or utility 
maximizing, and so forth, we would not need to have you settle how fast 
we should drive; we could decide for ourselves and achieve 
coordination, expertise, and efficiency.‖111 As Alexander puts it, 
uncertain rules ―do not settle for Agnes and Ben the particular question 
they need to have settled in order to coordinate desirably and 
efficiently.‖112 But who is to say that the hypothetical citizens needed 
coordination as to the specific question being considered? Even if 
                                                          
 111. Id. at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Id. 
82 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:53 
private actors need a good deal of coordination from law, that does not 
imply that they require law to coordinate all their behavior. Perhaps 
traffic rules are an area where standards of reasonable conduct are 
sufficient to provide effective coordination. With due respect, Professor 
Alexander‘s argument here appears to reduce to the circular proposition 
that if parties need formalistic rules in a particular domain to coordinate 
their behavior, then they need formalistic rules in that domain to 
coordinate their behavior. That parties faced coordination problems ―that 
led them to seek Lex‘s determination in the first place‖113 does not imply 
that they sought formalistic legal rules for every possible issue they 
might face. 
The danger here is not unlike the one faced by the excessively 
concerned parent or the micromanaging supervisor. Just because 
children and employees need some guidance does not mean that those in 
power should take every opportunity to offer guidance. Sometimes, there 
is no need for authoritative guidance because coordination emerges 
naturally or through some alternative mechanism, like social norms.
114
 
Sometimes, the guidance would simply be counterproductive in the real 
world. And sometimes, it is not worth whatever we would need to give 
up to achieve it. 
2.   The Potentially Ineffective Coordination of Formal Rules 
My second general concern with Professor Alexander‘s argument is 
that it appears to assume, without empirical justification, that formal 
rules in fact better coordinate behavior than less formal ones.
115
 On its 
own terms, Alexander‘s argument rests on a ―cognitive‖116 proposition—
namely, that even well-meaning private parties do not have, or could not 
process, all relevant moral information in order to determine the best 
course of conduct, all things considered.
117
 This is what Alexander 
means when he suggests that ―the problem law is meant to solve is that 
of information, not immoral motivation—that men are not gods, rather 
than that men are not angels.‖118 
A foundational empirical question in evaluating Alexander‘s 
argument is simply the degree to which these informational constraints 
matter in the real world. Surely they do sometimes, but the question is 
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whether, for any particular legal question, they demand an absolutely 
certain response to eliminate coordination problems among private 
parties. Alexander does not directly answer this question, but in my view 
his argument seems to assume that the answer favors formalism. I am 
not so sure, however, that it does. 
Consider, again, Alexander‘s example of well-meaning drivers that 
want coordination so that they can use the roads. Alexander argues that 
―standards‖—that is, uncertain laws—―do not improve their ability to 
determine what they need to determine‖ in order to drive safely.‖119 But 
even the vaguest standards might be helpful, at least in the simple 
Bayesian sense that all new information can update people‘s conditional 
probabilistic assessments of the world. A rule like ―drive reasonably‖ (a 
―pure standard‖120 with little certainty in direct application) still gives the 
parties information, even on Alexander‘s terms: it might mean ―your 
judgment is fine here, even if you might not always be able to rely on it 
in the general case.‖ Alexander admits that a standard that incorporates a 
list of factors (and excludes others) provides some information to the 
parties,
121
 but—for the same reason—the lawmaker‘s choice of a 
standard in a particular context can serve as an aid to coordination  
(even while addressing other goals of law not related directly  
to coordination).
122
 
Moreover, ―reasonableness‖ isn‘t the only possible basis for a 
standard; the law might have chosen to apply some other judgmental 
mode (like morality or sensitivity to motive), or propose a different 
tradeoff or emphasis. Road signs often say something that amounts to 
little more than ―drive safely here,‖ when presumably safe driving is 
always desirable; those signs still provide information, or at least 
reminders. Even very vague standards can do the same. 
More generally, experience tells us that people do not always know 
the law, that they cannot always process its specific directives easily, and 
so on. Whether a rule will be understood or known, whether it can easily 
be followed, and what incentives it will provide in the real world are of 
course important criteria in determining how well it coordinates 
behavior—even, again, were coordination the only goal of legal rules. 
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And to the extent that real-world coordination is a goal of law, it is 
important to recognize that private parties care not about the certainty of 
legal rules but about the certainty of their real-world results. Mel 
Eisenberg put it best: 
  First, many people plan on the basis of law implicitly rather than 
explicitly, because they do not know the law. For these people, 
planning on the basis of law consists of acting on the implicit belief 
that if a person conducts himself in a way that society regards as 
proper, he will be deemed to have acted lawfully, and if a person is 
injured by conduct that society regards as wrongful, he will have the 
law‘s protection. An overemphasis on certainty can make this type of 
planning less reliable. 
  Second, even actors who do explicitly plan on the basis of law don‘t 
need certainty. If certainty was necessary for planning there would be 
no planning, because life is uncertain. . . . 
  Moreover, to the extent that certainty is needed for planning, what 
is needed is not certainty of rule, but confidence in result. A lawyer can 
often predict a result with confidence even if he is uncertain about the 
legal rule. Usually a lawyer can determine not only that the legal rule is 
probably rule A, but that the only likely alternative is rule A1. 
Frequently the lawyer can conclude that whether the rule is A or A1, 
the result in a given case will be the same.
123
 
B. Law and Democracy as Formal Rules 
Often, commentators reach results similar to Alexander‘s but 
without as precise an argument. They may derive the result that law 
requires formalism from very general propositions about freedom or 
democracy, for example. It is hard to evaluate these arguments because 
so often they appear entirely circular, or at least as unsupported 
assertions. For example, Friedrich Hayek wrote: ―Nothing distinguishes 
more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under 
arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great 
principles known as the Rule of Law.‖124 So far, perhaps, so good. But 
Hayek then defined the ―Rule of Law‖ as follows: 
Stripped of all technicalities, [the Rule of Law] means that government 
in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the  
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authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to 
plan one‘s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.
125
 
If Hayek meant to emphasize that the certainty is needed only when 
the alternative would be unfair, there is little to object to in his 
definition, although it is the rare case that requires an absolutely fixed 
rule in order to avoid unfairness.
126
 At least, determinations that the law 
is unfair simply because it is context-sensitive, or simply because 
precedent that is no longer desirable can be overruled, would require a 
specific context-sensitive showing that is almost always absent in the 
abstract argumentation that characterizes most discussion of political 
theory. Too often, the opposite of absolute certainty seems to be 
presented as arbitrary lawlessness, rather than context-sensitive 
lawmaking that relies on the judgment of sophisticated judges. Thus, for 
example, Robert Summers presents the following two alternatives: ―A 
Government may govern largely through law publicly laid down in 
advance, or it may govern largely through ad hoc, un-coordinated, non-
uniform, and sometimes even retrospective decisions and decrees.‖127 
More generally, Hayek‘s principle is not usually restricted to 
matters of fairness. Often, judges and commentators claim that 
something (although it is never clear exactly what) essential in law or 
democracy requires all uncertainty to be eliminated. Often, once again, 
this drive to certainty is framed as a distinction between the rule of law 
and a rule of arbitrary human tyranny. Thus, for example, Justice 
Antonin Scalia has written: ―Long live formalism. It is what makes a 
government a government of laws and not of men.‖128 Historian A. 
Whitney Griswold, however, pointed out that there is no such thing in 
the abstract as a government made exclusively of ―laws,‖ or at least of 
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But what to follow, is a task indeed.)  
ALEXANDER POPE, Epistle III to Allen Lord Bathurst: Of the Use of Riches, in THE POEMS OF 
ALEXANDER POPE, 570, 580 (John Butt ed., 1963) (1733). 
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formal rules: ―Laws are made by men, interpreted by men, and enforced 
by men, and in the continuous process, which we call government, there 
is continuous opportunity for the human will to assert itself.‖129 The 
question cannot be whether the human will is suppressed in all 
government; the question should instead be whether that will is applied 
to right or wrong ends or to good or bad policies. 
I admit a vague unease with my repeated resort to substantive 
judgment of what is ―right‖ or ―good.‖ I recognize that reliance on 
judgment, unbounded, has the potential to lapse into the sort of extreme 
legal realism that Lon Fuller feared but, I suspect, was also drawn to.
130
 
It is telling, perhaps, that in his brilliant fictional cases in The Problems 
of Jurisprudence,
131
 the most pragmatic, ―realist‖ judge was also the 
most caricatured.
132
 It is also perhaps notable that the example he did not 
have time to elaborate, The Case of the Interrupted Whambler,
133
 both 
(1) presents a more compelling pragmatic realist, and (2) more directly 
reflects the kind of reasoning in the common law, as opposed to 
constitutional or statutory reasoning.
134
 Interestingly, as Ofer Raban has 
observed, Hayak ended up similarly distinguishing statutes from cases 
later in life and tolerating greater uncertainty in the common law.
135
 
 
 
                                                          
 129. A. Whitney Griswold, The Basis of a Rule of Law, in LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE 
DEMOCRATIC IDEAL AND OTHER ESSAYS 124 (1959). Similarly, as I have previously written:  
To argue that judges‘ interpretive discretion be narrowed because the rule of law requires 
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Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 133 n.25 (2009). 
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 132. See, for example, the imaginary opinion of Chief Judge Truepenny in Fuller‘s The Case of 
the Interrupted Whambler. Id. at 628. 
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 134. See id. 
 135. See Raban, supra note 11, at 190. 
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V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAINTY ON EFFICIENCY 
As I noted previously, it is common to see legal economists favor 
certainty, though often for distinct and sometimes contradictory 
reasons.
136
 Often, however, there is little economic or other instrumental 
reason for absolute certainty in the law. 
Perhaps what motivates the bulk of economic commentary on 
certainty is the notion that needlessly uncertain rules inhibit the efficient 
allocation of resources. Thus, for example, a system of property law that 
left ownership up to pure chance, or a system of contract that enforced 
contracts based on the flip of a coin, would clearly complicate both 
productive planning and litigation strategy.
137
 For obvious reasons, 
however, there is little or no significant argument in favor of needless 
uncertainty. Clearly, there is little to be said for making law arbitrary 
even though courts and commentators are settled on an appropriate non-
arbitrary principle to apply. 
Uncertainty typically arises because of a certain rule‘s basic 
incapacity to address the variety of social considerations that the law 
deems important, at least in particular adjudicative contexts. Thus, for 
example, courts may apply a broad standard of reasonable behavior to 
judge people‘s behavior in negligence law because they believe a 
specific rule would miss some salient features of cases. The uncertainty, 
then, results from the limits of our knowledge or analysis in a particular 
area; it can be reduced only at the cost of introducing significant errors 
or undesirable judgments into law.
138
 
There are at least two significant, broad reasons that economic 
reasoning ought to avoid promoting the arbitrary elimination of all 
uncertainty that is not needless uncertainty. This Part outlines those 
reasons briefly. The point of this Part is not to engage in specific 
economic modeling, which is beyond the scope of this Article; it is 
simply to suggest reasons that uncertainty does not lead to economic 
inefficiency in a variety of cases. 
Most economic reasoning concerns the development of rational 
responses to an uncertain world; thus, for example, the notion of 
expected utility is fundamental to most practical economic reasoning.
139
 
Maximizing certainty does not by itself maximize expected utility; 
indeed, less predictability just implies more variance in utility without 
necessarily affecting expected utility at all. 
                                                          
 136. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Bayern, supra note 78, at 955. 
 138. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 26, at 591-95. 
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Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have offered a view of contract 
interpretation that rests on the distinction between expected utility and 
variance.
140
 The general form of their argument is easy to state: parties 
that are risk-neutral, like perhaps some large corporations, care only 
about the average result of a legal rule; they do not care about the 
variance in that legal rule.
141
 I have previously critiqued this argument as 
applied to contract interpretation specifically,
142
 but I believe the form of 
the argument is extremely useful in some other contexts. That is, in cases 
where a legal rule‘s uncertainty truly increases only the variance from a 
mean result, then at least risk-neutral parties will likely not be harmed 
from the uncertainty. 
For example, suppose that a rule of damages in tort law is uncertain, 
but that its average is generally well understood: large companies that 
potentially injure people (or the large companies that agree to insure a 
potential injurer) might face anywhere between $1 million and $3 
million for causing a particular kind of injury, with the average known to 
be about $2 million. When uncertainty—really just risk in this context—
is modeled in this way, it is true that a risk-neutral party will not benefit 
from certainty alone. Accordingly, in evaluating certainty in economic 
terms, it may be helpful to consider precisely what is uncertain; if the 
uncertainty is simply in variance on a linear scale, then there are many 
plausible cases where it matters only to parties who are not risk-neutral. 
Similarly, it is often helpful to consider offsetting effects of 
certainty. For example, often one party‘s certainty is the focus of 
analysis; it is claimed that one type of actor will suffer if a legal rule is 
not absolutely certain. Even accepting that this may be true for 
argument‘s sake, however, one party‘s certainty is often another party‘s 
uncertainty, and determining the efficient legal rule will need to consider 
the costs for both parties. 
As an example, a purpose of the classical negligence rule that 
plaintiffs could not sue for emotional harms a wrongdoer who unleashed 
physical forces unless those forces had a physical impact on the 
plaintiff
143
 was that the impact gave appropriate notice of a potential suit 
to the wrongdoer. At bottom, this is an argument about certainty; the 
tortfeasor‘s world is inappropriately uncertain, the argument goes, if he 
or she faces unknown suits from every instance of his or her negligence. 
This might, in turn, chill potentially dangerous activity like driving 
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automobiles. But however powerful (or not) this argument is, there is an 
equally powerful (or not) argument for certainty on the victim‘s side: if 
the rule forecloses all liability, people will face uncertain prospects when 
putting themselves in situations where they might be emotionally injured 
by near-miss automobile accidents, and they may inefficiently be chilled 
from those activities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Certainty is not a goal to seek at all costs. Even those who think 
certainty is the law‘s central or exclusive function do not seem willing to 
use law to stifle, for example, social, political, or technological change in 
order that private parties can know exactly where they stand. If absolute 
certainty were a goal that the law sought to impose, it could achieve it by 
preventing change in all areas of life: it could prevent technology 
companies from being formed, scientific research from advancing, and 
political sentiment from changing. No modern arguments, of course, 
seem to go that far. 
Far from being a singular, fixed goal of law, certainty is at best 
subordinate to particular social propositions like the unfairness alleged 
by those who have reasonably relied on an existing rule. Certainty 
provides benefits, if at all, in substantive terms. 
Those benefits need to be weighed in context; countervailing social 
propositions, like the morality or efficiency of a better rule that might 
replace an old one, may well be more significant than those served by 
certainty. Perhaps surprisingly, courts and commentators are often 
entirely blind to the particular contexts in which their arguments about 
certainty operate; thus, for example, a court might decline to change an 
undesirable doctrine even though nobody (or at least nobody acting 
morally) could plausibly have relied on it.
144
 Or a judge might cry out for 
certainty even though the parties themselves would seem to have little 
reason, except self-serving rhetorical reasons, to care about it.
145
 
This Article has served as a call for context-specific evaluations of 
arguments in favor of certainty. The specific examples offered in Part III 
do not show, in the general case, anything more than the error into which 
courts sometimes fall when they overemphasize certainty. Nonetheless, 
those examples serve to highlight the kinds of factual contexts that may 
weaken general, abstract calls for certainty in law. The remainder of the  
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Article critiqued various abstract arguments for certainty and tried to 
show, at the very least, that they do not meet the persuasive burden that 
ought to be necessary for arguments that seek to exclude legal decision 
makers from considering context in evaluating the merits of arguments. 
